

Geffery Mayor.

*Jovis X^o die Febr. 1685, Annoq; Regni Regis
JACOBI Secundi, Angl. &c. Secundo.*

THIS COURT doth desire
Mr. *Staynoe* to Print his Sermon
Preached at *Bow-Church* on *Saturday* last
the Sixth Instant (the day of His Ma-
jesties Accession to the Crown) before
the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, and
the Members of the several Compa-
nies of this City.

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WAGSTAFFE.

Subjection for Conscience sake,
IN A
S E R M O N
Preached before the
RIGHT HONOURABLE
THE
Lord Mayor,
THE
Court of **ALDERMEN,**
And the Several
COMPANIES,
A T
BOW-CHURCH, on the Sixth of
February, being the **KING's Day.**

By **T H O. S T A Y N O E,** B. D. Rector of
S t. E T H E L B U R G H.

L O N D O N, Printed for *Robert Littlebury* at the
Kings-Arms in Little-Britain. 1 6 8 6.

Do: Merveth?



T O
The Right Honourable
Sir Robert Geffery, Knight ;
LORD MAYOR
Of the City of
LONDON.

My LORD,

T Hough the Request of your Lordship to me, first to Preach, and after that to Print the following Sermon, could not but have its effect upon one, who knows that a Magistrates Request is in effect a Command set off with Courtesie and Condescension; and so my Answer to both was not so properly a Compliance, as an Obedience; yet my Obedience to the last was (I confess) made the more willing and chearful by that Loyal insinuation that you offered as the reason for it; which was, that it might be instrumental to convince the people of their duty to their King: Because indeed it was for that very reason why I Preached it. And though I thought that reason a good one, when it was only private as my own; yet I could not but value it something.

The Dedication.

thing the more, when I found that it had your Lordships approbation. And because it had so, therefore what was before barely my design, does now become my Hope ; that is, I can even flatter my self that my Discourse may help to undeceive those that are in the wrong way, and confirm those that are in the right. And that it may do so is the business of my Prayers, as well as of my Preaching and Printing. For it is God alone, who can make so slight means effectual for so great purposes. To his Protection I Recommend your Lordship. I am

My Lord,

Your Faithful and

Obedient Servant

T. S.

A
S E R M O N
O N

R O M. XIII. 5.

*Wherefore we must needs be subject, not only for Wrath,
but also for Conscience sake.*

THE words being only an inference from something which the Apostle had laid down before, we must carry our thoughts a little backward to the Context, that so we may from thence the better proceed to make out the Necessity of that Subjection, that he here lays upon us; and that double obligation to it both from Wrath and Conscience. And that we may not be too tedious in repeating his whole Discourse from the beginning of the Chapter, (though it be all very applicable to our present purpose) let it suffice at present only to recount, what he tells us in the latter part of the foregoing verse; where he gives us a twofold account of the Magistrates Power, first in reference to the Derivation of it, and

and so he calls him the Minister of God : Secondly, in reference to the Execution of it upon those that do evil, and so he calls him a Revenger to execute wrath. From which two Considerations of the Magistrates power he deduces that double necessity of Subjection, that lies upon us, and tells us, that we must needs be subject, not only for Wrath, because he is a Revenger to execute wrath ; but also for Conscience sake, because he is the Minister of God.

How good the Apostles way of Reasoning is, and how cogent the force of each of those Conclusions, we shall have occasion to enquire by and by : But before we proceed to that part of our Discourse, we must propound some things, which may be fair Introductions to it.

And the first thing to that purpose will be to enquire, to whom it is that the Apostle urges our necessity of Subjection ; or what those persons are to be, who from this Text may lay a claim to our Obedience ; where it is far from my design to raise a dispute about the right and title of Princes : what it is, that may either instate or continue them in a just possession of their Dominions, and give them a lawful superiority over their respective Territories by what means soever obtained, whether by birthright, suffrage or conquest. No : such disputes

Disputes do chiefly concern, and therefore also are chiefly managed by such, whose business it is therefore to amuse people with nice speculations about Governments, that by that means they may the better prepare them to unhinge and overturn them. Let it suffice then at present to take notice, that it is agreed on all hands, that wheresoever there is a right in the superiority, there Obedience in inferiors becomes a Duty, and that where the Supremacy is just, there the Subjection mentioned in the Text is necessary. This even they'll confess, who do not care to practise it: And though it may thwart their *Inclinations*, yet we always find it consonant to their *Professions*. For there is no man so much a ravening wolf inwardly, but he will put on sheeps clothing; and though his Resolutions are bent upon Rebellion, yet his Discretion and Prudence will prompt him to pretend Religion. This we know from all History, and from our own Experience, which has furnished us with as *many* or *more* instances in the case, than History it self. If therefore we may take that for granted, which no man was ever yet so steel'd as to deny, that a Subjection is due to those that have a just and lawful power over us; then it will be no hard matter to resolve the question now in hand, and to determine to whom it is that *our* Subjection is due.

And here, though the *Text* might allow our Discourse to be general, yet the *Occasion* will not; and because the business that we are now upon concerns only our own Nation; therefore I would here take occasion *so* to preface my Discourse, as that *that* may do so too. For though the Subjects of other Kingdoms are obliged respectively to the same Duty, yet I do not at present pretend to teach Obedience in *England* to the Inhabitants of *Vienna* or *Madrid*. No! I shall proceed in a more proper and seasonable method; and shall bring home that duty to our selves by a *particular* application, which the Apostle only lays down in *general*; and shall shew that that Subjection is a necessary duty to our *own* Prince, which, he tells us, is so to *all*. For whether the word *ἐξουσία*, which we render Power, and to which my Text does refer, do signifie *lawful* Power or not (which we need not now dispute) yet the least that can be infer'd from the words will be a Subjection to lawful Authority, and by consequence also to our own Prince. For the truth of all which I shall urge no more at present than the tacit confession of his most avowed and professed Enemies; who after all their contrivance of wit, anger, and malice, could at length pitch upon no better expedient to prevent his right of Accession, than a Bill of Exclusion.

clusion. Now such a Bill either presupposes an antecedent right, or it does *not*: If it does *not*, then it must be confessed, that they did most elaborately trifle, whilst they took a great deal of pains to bring that about, that was already done to their hands. If it *does*, then we have what we look for, and that is, that the injustice of *their* actions does make good the justice of his Title, and affords us a *tacit* confession, that there was no other way to overthrow *that* Title, but by overturning the very foundations of the Government it self. Be it *one*, or be it the *other*, and in courtesie to them let them take their choice: But *then* withal let them consider, that if they choose the *last*, they tax their own *honesty*; and if the *first*, their own *understanding*: To which we add, that whether they choose the *last* or the *first*, it is hoped that they may by either means be made sensible of Reason and Duty; that is, that the *superiority* does in *Justice* belong to *Him*; and that therefore the *subjection* does in *Conscience* belong to *themselves*.

The *second* thing that will make our way more plain and easie, will be to shew you, what is meant by being subject for *Wrath*, and what for *Conscience* sake. And here taking it for granted at present, that by Necessity of Subjection in the Text is meant nothing else but a moral Obligation to that

submission, that is due from us to our Superiors ; and that that moral Obligation (as indeed all others of the same nature) must take its force from some Law or other, and that that Law that lays this obligation upon us, is just and good ; (all which we shall make good in the Series of our Discourse) we shall only now acquaint you in the general, That the Law that thus binds us to Subjection does (as all other just and perfect Laws do) consist of two parts, its Direction, or what it requires to be *obeyed* ; and its Sanction, or what upon disobedience it requires to be *suffered* ; whereof the Casuists usually call the first *Obligatio ad culpam*, and the last *Obligatio ad pœnam* ; which the Reverend and Learned Doctor Sanderson upon the Text takes to be the same with that double Necessity of Subjection, that the Apostle speaks of, both for Wrath and Conscience. Which Exposition will seem very rational, if we do but consider, that we pay our Obedience to every Law upon one of these two Motives, that is, either out of a *sense* of our *Duty*, or else out of an *apprehension* of our *Punishment* : To the first of which we are engaged by our Conscience, as knowing that we ought to do it ; and to the last by our Interest, as desiring to secure our selves from that *vengeance*, which is the reward of Disobedience. The
first

first is filial and genuine, the last is vile and slavish, but *both* are useful; and therefore it is that the Apostle grounds the necessity of our Subjection upon *both*, and tells us, that we *must needs be subject*, not only for Wrath, but also for Conscience sake.

Having therefore thus far explained to you the double obligation to Subjection in the Text; our next business should be to enquire, wherein the Necessity of this twofold obligation does consist: But because the time will not allow us to speak to both of them, therefore we shall pitch upon that, which is most material, which will be to make it out, whence the Necessity of our Subjection does arise upon the account of Conscience.

And to do this we shall not wander from our Text, in which it is expressly asserted by the Apostle, that we *must needs be subject for Conscience sake*. From whence we shall infer this following Proposition to instruct us from whence our obligation to Subjection upon the account of Conscience does arise; and that is, that we are *therefore* obliged in Conscience to be in Subjection to the superior powers, because God himself commands us so to be. So that the ultimate resolution of this Question, why the Obligation to Subjection does extend it self to the Conscience, is fully satisfied by

by this Answer, because God commands us to be subject. And because the true foundation of all lawful and just Civil power is laid here, therefore take the proof of it in these two following Propositions :

Whereof the first is this: *That that Obligation whereby we are bound in Conscience to be subject to the Higher Powers, neither does nor can arise from any humane Constitutions whatsoever.* For the clearing of which we must know, That the Obligation of any Law cannot possibly be greater than the power of the Legislator that makes the Law; which will easily be granted by any man, who will but allow himself the leisure to consider, that no power can exceed it self, or bring that to pass, which is wholly out of the reach of its most extended capacity. Now that it is out of the extent of any Legislative power, but Gods, to lay any Obligation upon the Conscience, will be evident, if we consider what is of necessity required in any Legislator to make his Laws obligatory. And first, he must be in a capacity to know, whether the persons, to whom his Laws are directed, are obedient to them, or not. And secondly, He must be in a capacity to execute the Sanctions of his Laws upon those that disobey them. Now it is equally out of the Magistrates power to know

know whether his Subjects comply with his Laws out of Conscience, and so to reward and encourage their sincerity ; or whether they do it barely out of Fear and Interest , and so to punish their partial and hypocritical Obedience. For it is Gods Prerogative to search the heart ; and the *knowledg* of the Conscience does peculiarly belong to the attribute of his Omniscience ; so that though the Magistrates Laws do oblige the Conscience, yet it is not by any force of their own, but only by virtue of those Laws, which the King of Heaven and Earth has laid upon every soul to bind them to be subject to the Higher Powers. But that we may make the business more clear (if possible) let us put the case that the Magistrate makes such a Law, to which every Subject is bound in Conscience to pay an obedience ; and then inquire whether or no by making such a Law he does lay any new Obligation upon the Conscience distinct from that, whereby we are bound by God to be subject to the Higher Powers. And though indeed some great Persons have determined the Question in the affirmative, yet if we impartially weigh all circumstances, we shall find that Reason will vouch for the negative. For if the Magistrates Command in this case does lay a new Obligation upon the Conscience distinct from that of Gods Law ; then it must follow that
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it is a greater sin to break the Magistrates Law, than Gods; because it must needs be a greater sin to break a double, than a single Obligation of Conscience. And if from the Prince we still descend to inferior Magistrates, the result at last will be, that a Constable's command, if it be authorised by the Prince, will have a more forcible tie upon the Conscience, than either *that* of the King or of God himself: Because as we are bound in Conscience to obey the King, because God commands it; so if the King commands it, we are bound in Conscience to obey the Constable; and therefore if by the Kings Command there be a new Obligation laid upon the Conscience distinct from that of Gods Law; then, by parity of reason, by the Constable's command there will be a new Obligation laid upon the Conscience distinct from that of the Kings Law. And so at last our Obligations to the lowest Magistrate will be more than to the Highest; and by consequence he that only carries a painted stick will have a just title to more power than he that sways the Scepter; which because no man of reason can allow, therefore it must be granted, that the power of obliging the Conscience does only reside in God himself, and that he has not communicated it to Princes together with that authority, which he has derived down to them by it.

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The second Proposition therefore must be this, *That that Obligation that binds us in Conscience to be subject to the Higher Powers, comes from God.* Now this Proposition is only a natural consequence from the former, and from the Text in conjunction. For our Text tells us, that we must be subject for Conscience sake, and our former Proposition acquaints us, that meer humane Authority can lay no such Obligation upon the *Conscience*. The first Conclusion therefore will be, that this Obligation must be laid upon us by some other Law, than that of man. And then if it be inquired, who besides man *can* or *does* lay any such Obligation upon us, the only Answer, that remains to be given in such a case, is that the Obligation must come from God. For in that station and capacity, that God has placed the whole race of Mankind in this world, we are all of us utter strangers to any other Laws, than those of God and man; and therefore whenever there is any Legal Obligation laid upon us, that does not come from the *last*, we are demonstratively certain, that it comes from the first. And that in the case of Government, our Obligation to Subjection does do so, we may be yet farther assured out of the Divine Codes themselves.

And not to trouble either our selves or you to pick out the several Laws to this purpose scattered
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through the whole Book of God : Hear only what the great Law-giver says in the first verse of the Chapter, where our Text stands, *Let every soul be subject to the Higher Powers.* And that ye may know this to be the voice of God, the Apostle by the Spirit of God does three times together assure us so, when he adds, *That there is no power but of God : That the powers that are, are ordained of God : And that they that resist them resist the Ordinance of God.*

From all which the Conclusion at last will be, That we must needs be subject to our own Prince, and that too for Conscience sake, because he is the Minister of God. For if no power less than that of God himself can oblige the Conscience, and yet we are obliged in Conscience to be subject to the lawful Magistrate (both which we have made appear) then it will follow that God has given the lawful Magistrate a title to that Authority, to which we are obliged in point of Conscience to be subject, and that therefore (considering now what to this purpose was spoken at the beginning) we are obliged in Conscience to be subject to our own Prince, because he is the Minister of God.

And now one would think, that from what has been said a Christian mans Conscience might be satisfied in his duty towards his Prince. But yet there are a sort of men in the world, who though they

they do always complain, that we do not quote Scripture *enough*, when we discourse upon any *other* Subject, yet when we discourse about *Subjection* to Government, do always complain, that we do quote too *much*. And therefore they are by no means willing, that the case of Subjection should be measured by that Rule. And therefore before I part with this head, I shall leave with you some few Considerations, which may prove an additional confirmation to the Doctrine already laid down, and by so doing may also assist your Integrity against the attempts of crafty and seditious people, who in this case lie in wait to deceive.

And to this purpose I would have you consider in the first place, That when the Scripture calls the Magistrate the Minister of God, (though by its *so* doing we are as much assured, that he is *so*, as we are assured that the Scripture is *true*) yet the Scripture by telling us this truth, does not therefore *make* it a truth. And therefore if the Magistrate were not the Minister of God antecedently to the Scriptures saying *so*, the Scripture in such a case would not tell us the truth. From hence then we may infer, that Government is the Ordinance of God, though the Scripture had never acquainted us with any such thing.

2^{ly}. I would have you consider, that every man was born under some Government or other ; and

that if he changes his Country, he cannot (so far as History and Geography has instructed us) betake himself to any inhabited part of the world, which is not, before his arrival thither, under some or other Political Constitution and Government. But if there should chance to be found any such obscure and barbarous place, where there is no settled Government, yet that cannot prejudice our present Discourse, because we are very well assured, that that is none of our case here at home.

3^{dly}. I would have it considered, that neither the Laws of Nature, Reason, nor Justice will ever allow us to endeavour to strip the lawful Governments of any places (either where we live, or where we are born Subjects) of their Authority, any more than they will allow us to take away any other mans lawful right, or just possessions. For for that very reason, that *Supremacy* is a *right* that belongs to *them*, *Subjection* is a *duty*, that belongs to *us*.

4^{ly}. I would have it considered, that the Laws of Nature, Reason and Justice are the Laws of God.

And lastly, From all these Considerations put together I would have you try, whether or no we may not fairly and rationally draw this Conclusion, That the Law of God does command our Subjection to the Higher Powers, though the Scripture had never told us any such thing; and that because this Obligation

gation does come from God, therefore it does reach our Conscience. And when it once does so, then let the Government have been formed when it will, and by whom it will ; yet in such a case because the Governours have a just and undoubted title to and possession of their Supremacy, we cannot withdraw our Subjection from them, unless we break the Law of God. For it is against the Law of God, and by consequence against an Obligation of Conscience, for any man to deny to another his due ; let that due become his due by what means it *will*.

I can foresee but one Objection against all that we have said, which has by the enemies of settled Governments been dressed up and set off in several shapes and colours, but yet in conclusion is always the same, and it is this :

That though it be granted, that we ought to be subject to the Higher Powers, and that too out of Conscience, when they *do* and *command* that, which is lawful and right ; yet the case seems to be quite altered, when without any regard to the Laws of Justice, or the Government, their actions do manifestly tend to the Subversion of Justice and Right, and instead thereof do load our necks with Injuries and Oppression. And when they do so, then we are taught, that our Text has lost its hold of our Conscience, and that we may fairly and honestly renounce our Subjection.

Before

Before I speak directly to the Objection, I must premise one or two things : whereof the

First is, That that design is justly suspicious, which measures our Duty by our Temporal Interest. And that this is the case in the present Objection, is too notorious to require any proof.

Secondly, I do premise, that Subjection being a general term, does couch in it a *double* but disjunctive Obligation. For though in some cases we may stand bound in Conscience to obey the Commands of the Magistrate, and in other some we may *not* ; yet in both we stand bound to make good our Subjection. Because it is as well an act of *Subjection*, peaceably and quietly to *submit* to the *Penalty*, as it is actually to *obey* the *Command*. And therefore if those that make the Objection, do notwithstanding allow the Obligation to this disjunctive Subjection, we readily close hands with them, and the Controversie is at an end. But if they do not (and it is to be suspected, that that is their meaning, if they would speak out) then it is apparent, that (when they tell us, that we are not to be subject in the case objected) their meaning is, that we may defend our disobedience by resistance. And then the Objection put into plain *English* amounts to thus much, That when ever the Prince does not govern us according to the Laws of Justice,
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and those of the Land, there it is lawful for *us* to resist and rebell against *him*.

Now as it is apparent, that such Doctrine as this is seditious and treasonable, so it is our present business to make it appear to be likewise absurd and false. For if a Subject does resist his Prince, though it be in such a case, in which it is supposed that his Prince does him an injury; he does by so doing stand guilty of these following acts of Injustice.

1. He takes upon him to be *Judg* in his own case: Now because he that does so may be rationally supposed to be biased in his judgment, by self-love, by malice, revenge, covetousness, and the like train of lusts and passions; and over and above in the present case by pride and ambition; therefore all those wise men, who have made it their business to instruct us in the Laws of Justice and Equity, have with one consent condemned the practice of it. And if it be an encroachment upon the Laws of Justice for any man to be only a *Judg* in his *own* case; it will be more undoubtedly so for him to be *Judg* and *Executioner* too, which is notoriously the *Rebells* case. We are told by a late seditious Libel, that the King cannot in his own person judg any Case, though it be only about the limits and jurisdiction of those Courts which are of his own Constitution or appointment (it is a point of
Law,

Law, and I do not so much as pretend to pass my judgment upon it, but leave it to those whose business it is.) But then I must remark, that he, that so briskly takes up his own Prince in such a case as *that*, would undoubtedly bestow his Censures much more freely upon the Emperor of *Fez*, or the King of *Macapar*. But then when he has once told us, that Emperors and Kings must not *judg* their own Subjects in their *own person*, nor execute them *with* their own hands; it would go nigh to prove a puzzling question to him, whence the Rebel-Subject has such a power, and that too against his own Prince. And because we know that the Laws of Justice and Nature do forbid the Rebel thus to *judg* in his own Case; therefore we must esteem his so doing to be the pure effect of Injustice and Usurpation. For *z*dly. He that resists his Prince upon Supposition, that his Government is unjust, is therefore *so* himself, not only in that he undertakes to be a *Judg* in his own Cause, but in that also he does by so doing *usurp* to himself that Jurisdiction, which of right does belong to another. For there is no doubt but that the Title to the Sword is of right lodged in the Princes power; and there can be as little doubt that the Subject can acquire no right from the Injustice of the Prince to force it thence. For by the same Law that the Injustice of a Prince does entitle

title his Subjects to wrest the power of the Sword out of his hand against himself; I say, by the same Law the Injustice of any private man would give the *Injured* person a title to the Estate and Life of the *Injurious*. And so new Titles would continually start up with new Injuries, and in a little time the *right* to the whole world *would* (though perhaps the *possession* might not) belong to Injured persons, as *such*. Now it would go nigh to puzzle a Politick Rebel to shew us any difference in the present Instance between the case of the Injurious *Prince*, and *that* of the Injurious private man, besides this; that in the *last* case the revenge is to be put in execution by the Prince, and in the *first* upon him. Now if such a Law of Retaliation, which yet is the best Plea the Rebel hath, were but once well established, how would the very nature of all Mankind be altered on a sudden; every one would *court* an Injury, and, if it were from a great and rich man, he would *provoke* it too; and then if the Injury so courted or provoked did not presently settle him in the possession of the Injurious mans Title and Estate; yet it would at least give him a Title to employ all the power he could possibly rally, to force his way into such possession. But then when I say it would do so, I only mean by the same Reason and Justice by which the injured Rebel does invade the Authority and Life of his Sovereign, that is by none at all. For indeed

it is so absurd, that hardly any thing can be more so; and therefore it is no small part of a Rebels craft to represent it in such expressions, which shall not grate upon our common sense. For if the Supreme Prince, when he does an injury, might be questioned or punished for it at the Subjects Tribunal, the Prince in such a case must be as much a Subject as any Subject whatsoever, that is in deed and truth there would be no Prince, nor no Subject, and by consequence no Government, and so that great Ordinance of God would be presently cancelled throughout the whole World.

3^{dly}. He that resists his Prince upon supposition, that his Government is unjust, is so himself not only in that he usurps to himself that Jurisdiction, which of right belongs to the Prince alone: But in that also he invades the rights of every Subject under such Princes Dominion and Government. For every Prince is a publick person, and as such has not only a just Authority over the Rebel, but also over every other Subject within his Dominions. Now tho it should prove true (which yet, as we have seen, it does not) that the Prince by his injury to the Rebel does forfeit his Title to his Government over *him*; yet still there is another enquiry behind, and that is, Whether or no by such his Injury he forfeits his Title over the rest of his Subjects? If he does, then it seems that he may forfeit his Title as well where he
has

has *not* done an injury, as where he *has*. But because that would be an odd and unheard-of kind of forfeiture, therefore we must in the first place conclude, That a Prince by his injury to the Rebel does not forfeit the Title to his Government over the rest of his Subjects. And if he does not, then the Resistance of the Rebel must needs be unjust, because at the same time, and by the same means, that he tries to strip the Prince of his Authority over himself, he does do so also of his Authority over all the rest of his Subjects. Now as the right of the Prince to govern his other Subjects does still remain undoubted and intire; so every other Subject under that Authority has a right to be governed by it; and therefore he that attempts to strip the Prince of such his Authority, does, so far at least, as he does so, invade the right of every honest and peaceable Subject, that is under that Authority. Because whoever endeavours to destroy such Authority, does at the same time rob the peaceable and contented Subject of all that Interest, which he has in it. And for the same reason that he that sets up an illegal Authority over any Subject, does injure that Subject, I say for the same reason he that displaces a lawful Authority over him, does injure him too. For as the Relation that is between a Prince and his Subject, is mutual, so the Right that they have in each other is mutual too. And therefore as

it is an injury to a Prince to deprive him of his Subjects ; so it is an injury to a Subject to deprive him of his Prince. For which reason as well as for a great many more, every Subject stands bound to defend his lawful Prince, as much as he stands bound to defend his own Right. And therefore as every Rebel does by his Rebellion invade the lawful rights of the Prince, so he does those of the Subject too, and therefore upon this account, as well as upon those two before mentioned, he is unjust.

To sum up all then, that has been said upon this Argument, in a few words. If the Rebel, notwithstanding the Injuries of his Prince be unjust, because he undertakes to judg his own cause himself: If he be unjust, because he usurps to himself a Jurisdiction over his Superior, that is, his Prince : If he be unjust, in that he invades the rights of all honest and peaceable Subjects ; and if Injustice (be it of what kind it will) be a breach of Gods Law, and by consequence a breach made upon the Obligations of Conscience ; then let him make what pretences he will, and colour his black deeds with fair shews and plausible designs ; and (which is yet a great deal more) let those designs and pretences be (which yet they very rarely or never are) true ; yet when all is done, till he can make it appear that it is lawful for him to do evil, that good may come of it, he will never be able to vindicate himself from

from the violation of **Gods Law**, nor of the Obligations of Justice and **Conscience**; and therefore notwithstanding the injuries of the Prince, he must stand a Convict Criminal, and his Rebellion will be a Damnable sin.

And so much may suffice to have been spoken to make it out, that there is an Obligation to Subjection laid upon our Conscience, what that Obligation means, and from whence it does arise.

Now before we part with our Text, we must know, that there are several Conclusions that offer themselves from the Doctrine already delivered, which are of great moment to our duty in the present case, which therefore take as follows.

The first is this, Ought we to be subject for Conscience sake, and is therefore our Obligation to Subjection bound upon us by the hand of God himself? Then we may very fairly infer, that both the Doctrine and Practice of Resistance comes from the Devil. For most undoubtedly any Practice or Doctrine does so, that stands in Diametrical Opposition to any Duty that is laid upon us by God. For, for the Rebel to put it to the Arbitration of force, whether he shall be subject to the Magistrate or no, is in effect to renounce the Obligation of Conscience, and to proclaim it to the World, that he does in that case disown all Subjection to the Law of God. For it cannot but be granted, but that if
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Gods Law had its due Obligation upon his Conscience, his Conscience under such a restraint must of necessity tie up his hands from Resistance. And therefore when people do resist their *Prince*, and yet at the same time pretend to fear their *God*: as we are infallibly sure, that such their pretensions are *false*; so we may be assured that they are blasphemous too, because they do insinuate that God allows the breach of his *own* Laws, and his *Name* is made use of for the violation of his *Commands*. For when we know that God does as peremptorily, as words can express it, command us to be subject to the Higher Powers; we must know also, that those that know this and intend conscientiously to obey it, will no more dare to resist their lawful Prince, than they will dare to resist their God; and that they must first list themselves among the Legions of Hell, and fight against Heaven; before they can possibly list themselves Rebels, and fight against their King. No, if it be Rebellion against God, deliberately, wilfully and resolutely to break his known Laws, then to any man, who knows those Laws, it will be the same Rebellion to resist his Vicegerent. And if that may truly be accounted a Devilish sin, which opposes Gods declared will with resolution and impudence; then because Rebellion against a lawful Prince does so, we may well reckon it to come from the Devil. And
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we may be rather induced to believe yet, that so it does, if we only take a transient view of those Means, and of those Persons who do usually set a Rebellion on foot.

And for the Means, our own late and sad Experience has made us too well acquainted with them. Take then a short List of them, as follows: Lies, Slanders, Libels, Factions, Seditions, Heresies, Perjuries; all black Crimes, and stigmatized as such by the Spirit of God himself. And because the same Spirit has acquainted us, that the Authors of such sins shall have their portion with the Devil and his Angels, we may be assured that such sins are the off-spring of Hell, for from Hell they came, and it is but justice that to Hell they should return. But though the designing Rebel does press these sins for the service of his Cause; yet they are not altogether so fit for his turn, till he has dawbed and varnished them over with hypocrisie, and by that means made them more superlatively criminal. And hence it comes to pass that pretences of Liberty, Property, Justice, Religion, and the Cause of God are then always most loud and clamorous, when a Rebellion is most likely to ensue. Now though it be a sin for a man barely to scatter abroad a malicious Slander; yet that very slander receives an addition of guilt, if it be attended with demureness and protestations of veracity and sincerity. Though

it be a great sin for a man to forswear himself, yet even this sin becomes much more heinous, when it is set off with Fasting, Prayers, and Sacraments. And though Factions, Seditious, and Tumults be great sins, yet their bulk is infinitely augmented, when Gods Name and Cause is brought in to abet them, and the Holy One that inhabits Eternity is vouched to countenance what his Soul abhors. Nay farther yet, as those sins that open the way for a Rebellion are always enhanced by Hypocrisie, so that Hypocrisie is no less aggravated by Impudence. And hence it comes to pass, that men of the most profligate Principles and Practices shall in such a case be always the most forward to cry up the cause of God and the Laws; and none more zealous defenders of Religion, and Patriots of the People, than such men, who have abandoned all sense of Justice, Godliness, and Honesty, and are become in their generation men renowned for Villany. Now though Hypocrisie be in it self a hateful sin, yet it becomes more ugly yet, when it is acted by a *Cromwell*, a *Martyn*, a *Peters*, a *Shaftsbury*; and such men must not only bid defiance to God, but to the common sense of Mankind too, before they can have the face to make their pretences to Religion and Honesty *publick*. And yet such men as these are always found at the head of every Treason, and of every Rebellion; and we have
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found by experience, that their business there has been to bring about such Rebellion by those very sins, which we have already, and just now mentioned. If therefore Rebellion be always forged by the Devils agents, and by the Devils tools, we may upon this account as well as the former, conclude that it comes from Hell. But to proceed :

2^{ly}. If we are bound in Conscience to be subject to the Higher Powers, and if such Obligation comes only from God, then we do infer, That no Lawful Authority can be founded in meer outward force. The reason is, because our Duty of Subjection to Lawful Authority arises from an Obligation of Conscience. Now though a long Sword may have terror enough in it (in many cases at least) to awe our *outward* actions; yet it can never have power enough to oblige our Consciences. And tho it may upon the account of our Interest engage us to a *compliance*, yet it will never be able upon the account of our *Consciences* to engage us to an *Obedience*. For if meer Power can instate a man in a just Title to the Supremacy, then it will follow, that whoever has power enough to *invade* the Throne, has *right* enough to *possess* it; and his Usurpation will therefore become *lawful*, because his strength has made it *possible*; and so at length the Robbers Sword and Pistol will come to be the only Standard of Justice, all other Power must be cancel'd, and we must come at last to make the *power* of doing *wrong* to be the only *measure* of *Equity & Right*. All these things are at least true, when there is any person in being,

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ing, to whom the Title or Succession of the Supremacy does belong, which (blessed be God) is our case at present. And therefore that great Argument, which was brought to vindicate the Usurpation of the successful Rebels in the late Wars, namely, that the *People* were not *bound* to adhere to their *Prince*, when the *Prince* was *disabled* to defend the *People*, supposes no other Obligation upon Subjects than meer Interest; and so evacuates and makes null all Obligations of Conscience. We shall therefore, before we part with this Inference, fix it as a certain Rule, by which every Conscientious Subject, *may* and *ought* to guide his Practice: That so long as there is any Person of the Royal Race, to whom by the course of Succession according to the Tenor of the Law of the Land the Crown does belong; so long we have a lawful Supremacy, and so long we shall be bound in Conscience to be in Subjection.

3^{ly}. Are we bound to be subject to the Higher Powers for Conscience sake, & does the Obligation of Conscience come only from God; then I do infer, that to bind the People to be in Subjection to their Prince, there is no necessity of any bargain or contract between them; & the reason is, because that *Obligation* that binds the Subject to obedience in this case is founded immediately & directly upon the Law of God. To this purpose we may take notice that let Governments be set up how they will, yet when once they are *so* set up, the Authority of the Supreme Governours in them does not come from those who model'd or fram'd the Government, or indeed that
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consented to such their model or frame, but it comes *from* and is founded upon the Law of God. And this does notoriously appear, as for some other reasons, so also for this; that in all Governments, the Princes or Supreme Governours are vested with the Power of the Sword, that is by interpretation, with the Power of Life and Death. Now it may rationally be questioned, whether those that nominated them to the Government, could by so doing give them any such power, and whether every man under such a Government does therefore stand bound to submit to such a power, because he has obliged himself so to do by his own Act and Deed. And truly when we come to scan the thing narrowly, we shall find that it is no such matter, because that forasmuch as every individual man in his private capacity has no power to dispose of his own life; therefore also he has no power to transfer any such power to another; and therefore also could never by his own Act and Deed make it over to the Magistrate, and by consequence the Magistrate must have it somewhere else than from a Deed of Gift by the people; that is, if we will speak sense, he has it from him who is the only Supreme Lord of Life and Death, even from God himself. And therefore even there where the nomination of the Supreme Magistrate is in the people, yet still his Authority comes from God. Just as a Corporation may choose their own Mayor or Bayliff, but yet all that while the Authority by which he afterwards governs such Corporation, does not come from them, but comes only from the King, and is meerly derived from him alone.

4thly. If we are bound in Conscience to be subject to the Higher Powers ; and if this Obligation be laid upon our Conscience by the hand of God himself, then it will very nearly concern us to have a care that we do not withhold our Obedience to the Magistrate upon false or idle pretences of Conscience, which I am somewhat more than afraid has been the case of some men, who upon pretences, that they would do nothing contrary to their Consciences, have hardly done any thing agreeable to common Honesty ; and when they have born us in hand that they would obey God rather than man, have taken great care to obey neither. For a man must first abjure his reason, before he can possibly believe that an honest and true Christian Conscience should engage a man rather to break Gods known and certain Laws, than to submit to his Governours in such things, concerning which those Laws make no mention at all. We should therefore do well to consider, that every Christian ought to submit himself to every ordinance of man for the *Lords* sake, and that no pretences of Conscience for his disobedience will stand him in stead at the great Tribunal but what are innocent and sincere. That though we may by pretences of Conscience *put off* the *Magistrate* and avoid our *duty* ; yet that we cannot by the same artifice *secure* our *souls* ; because we cannot by it *delude* our *God*. And therefore it concerns all people in this case to have a care, that while *they* endeavour by such pretences to *put off* the *Magistrate* and *delude* the *people*, that they do not cheat their own souls too. For
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though the disguise may look well enough to the easie and credulous vulgar; and sometimes be contrived so handsomely as to deceive wiser heads; yet we know, that all things are clear and open to the eyes of that God with whom we have to do; that he both *can* and *will* make that very Conscience a *revenger* of that disobedience, that the Hypocrite makes a *pretence* for it; and that when the thoughts of all hearts shall be revealed, he that would not be subject to his *Prince* out of Conscience, shall everlastingly sink under the wrath of his God.

5thly. And lastly, are we obliged to be subject to the Higher Powers out of Conscience; and is this Obligation laid upon our Conscience by God? Then I do infer, that no worldly inconvenience, that we can possibly suffer by such our Subjection, can be a sufficient warrant for our resistance. And the reason is plain and easie, because our Secular Interest, be it what it will, can never be a sufficient counterpoize to our duty; and he that will break Gods Commands, because it is for his secular advantage, can at the best but make that foolish bargain in the Gospel, that is, to *gain the whole world*, and in exchange for his purchase, to *lose his own soul*. And indeed when all things shall come to be scanned at that Tribunal, when we shall be judged by that Gospel, by which we ought now to walk; we shall find it thank-worthy, if a man for Conscience towards God has endured grief, suffering wrongfully, has prefer'd his innocence before his Liberty and his Interest, and has chosen rather to imitate his Saviours Meekness and Patience, than to break his Saviours Commands. And for all this
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and more to the same purpose, I must desire you to consult 1 Pet. 2. 11, to the latter end. I am sure the Gospel does no where put such a value upon our Interest in this world as in the least to allow us to secure it by a Rebellion: And if we have a sufficient license to act contrary to Gods Commands, because some inconvenience (be it more or less) may ensue upon our Subjection; then we must come at last to measure our Duty by our Interest, and not only Martyrdom, but all other sufferings for the Testimony or preservation of a good Conscience must be looked upon as nothing better than Religious Cheats. For not only Subjection to the Higher Powers, but most other Christian duties may prove disadvantageous to us in this world, and expose us to one injury or other; and perhaps the sincere practice of any one duty does one way or other always do so: And we know that the Doctrine of the Cross never yet promised to gratifie our fleshly lusts, and worldly appetites. And if the world will hate a Christian, because it hated Christ himself, then upon the same secular Principles that we may turn Rebels, we may go a shorter way to work to secure our selves from that hatred, and turn Atheists; which yet would be but in effect to do as the Rebel does, that is, swear and forswear, know no other measure of injuring our neighbour, but our Power; and murder another, provided that we can do it with security to our selves. For I know no reason why, if a man may *rebel* for his Liberty, Trade, or other Convenience; he may not likewise be a Drunkard, or a Whore-

Whoremaster for his pleasure ; may rob and defraud for his profit ; may murder for his revenge ; or break any other of Gods Commands, provided still that he does it for the same reason, for which he breaks the Command of Subjection, that is, for his worldly convenience or advantage. For when Duty and Conscience are put in the one scale, a Christian judgment will look upon them as such weighty things, that it will never let the Scales turn against them, though the whole world be put in the other.

All that now remains is to exhort you to the practice of that Duty which we have all along hitherto made it our business to *recommend* to you as coming from God, and which therefore as yet I have only perswaded you to entertain, because it is a *duty*, but because that is but a cold consideration, and is not likely to work upon *such*, who do not care to do their Duty for its *own* sake, therefore I shall here add, That as Subjection is our *Duty*, so also it is our *Interest* ; and (because I would have my Exhortation reach the worldling and the wicked) I do still moreover add, That it is our *worldly* Interest too. And that you may not think that what I now speak, is only a matter of Opinion, I shall be contented to refer you for farther satisfaction in the case to those who made trial of the sad and miserable Experiment in the late Rebellion ; for by that single Experiment we may be assured, that *their* condition and that *too even* as to *this* world, did therefore become miserable, because they started from this Obligation of Conscience, and by so doing revolted

revolted from their *God* and from their *King*. And if moreover I should set before your eyes that Scene of cruelty, destruction and desolation that must needs have spread it self over the face of the whole Nation, had their wicked attempt succeeded: It would go nigh to perswade you that all the worldly happinels, peace and security which we do at present enjoy, is purely owing to the Kings peaceable arrival to his Throne, and Confirmation in it, that is, to his Authority and Prudence, to the Duty and Honesty of such Subjects who out of *Conscience* to their *God*, proved true and faithful to their Prince. I might also tell you, and tell you true too, that it is purely owing to a former Rebellion, that our publick happinels is not equal to our wishes, that is, that it is not *intirely* compleat. And therefore it may in prudence become us to discover the way to our true and compleat happinels by looking upon the occasions of our disturbance and misery; and when we find the *last* in our *Treasons* and *Resistance*, to seek the *first* in our *Duty* and *Allegiance*. Which we ought therefore to do with the greater both sincerity and industry, because if the Successor be in right and equity the heir to the *debts* as well as to the Title of his Predecessors deceased; then we may be very well satisfied, that we have upon more accounts than one, some Duties to our Prince still upon the Score, and some Arrears of Subjection to be yet discharged. *To God the Father, &c.*

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